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COMMENT
RISING IN DEFENSE OF THE DECLARATION:
THE NATURAL SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO CONTRACT
Justin M. Goins'
I. INTRODUCTION

In the United States, "I have the right to do X" is a belief often asserted by
litigants,' political activists, 2 and even illegal immigrants.' Often, this belief
is applied to licentiousness or counter-cultural behavior as an ill-advised
justification or excuse. Although misguided,s who can fault aspirations of
personal autonomy, especially in a country founded on similar principles?

t Senior Staff, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 8. J.D. Candidate, Liberty
University School of Law (2014); B.A., Political Science: Pre-Law, University of Central
Florida (2011). To my captivating wife, Erin, I dedicate this Comment; thank you for your
patience and encouragement. Thank you also to Professor Tuomala, for graciously extending
your time and intellect, and to Senator Rand Paul from Kentucky, for speaking until you are
no longer able.
1. Madeleine Morgenstern, Texas Teen Suing School District After She Was Punished
For Not Reciting Mexican National Anthem In Class, THE BLAZE (Mar. 2, 2013, 7:04 PM),
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/02/28/texas-teen-suing-school-district-after-she-waspunished-for-not-reciting-mexican-national-anthem-in-class/ (reporting that high school
student filed suit because "her constitutional right to freedom of speech and equal protection
under the law" was violated).
2. Sandra Fluke, Slurs Won't Silence Women, CNN (Feb. 17, 2013, 3:34 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/13/opinion/fluke-contraception/index.html.
3. HADLEY ARKES, CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS & ANCHORING TRUTHS: THE
TOUCHSTONE OF THE NATURAL LAw 49 (2010). Professor Arkes, a political scientist and the
Edward N. Ney Professor of Jurisprudence and American Institutions at Amherst College,
recounts demonstrations on immigration in which many illegal immigrants were demanding
citizenship, despite their being in America illegally, or in violation of the positive law. Id. The
illegal immigrants were appealing to a standard of right and wrong, or natural law, because
they could not turn to the positive law. Id.
4. Fisher Ames, The Dangers of American Liberty, in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING
DURING THE FOUNDING ERA: 1760-1805 76 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald Lutz eds., 1983)
("The known propensity of a democracy is to licentiousness, which the ambitious call, and
the ignorant believe to be, liberty.").
5. See discussion infra Part IV. In general, this Comment argues that autonomy is
beholden to morality. Id. See also 1 Peter 2:16 ("Live as people who are free, not using your
freedom as a cover-up for evil, but living as servants of God.").
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Common sense tells us that our freedom to act is not unequivocal.'
Therefore, no matter how noble the endeavor, a man does not have the
right to do everything he pleases.! The notion that personal rights and
freedoms are subject to inherent limitation has long been understood.'
America, in particular, established this understanding in the Declaration of
Independence, which brazenly appeals to natural law.' The Declaration
6. Scholar Dr. Christian Overman says simply, "People are not free to break God's
moral laws." DR. CHRISTIAN OVERMAN, ASSUMPTIONS THAT AFFECT OUR LIVES 56 (6th ed.

2006) (1989). Dr. Overman points to the Hebraic view that man is not free to set his own
moral code, noting that "[man] may choose to violate the moral code God put in place, just
as he can choose to jump off the edge of a tall building, but in either case, the consequences
are such that to boast of "freedom of choice" is grossly misleading." Id. at 57.
7. Id. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-250 (West 1998); Wolkind v. Selph, 495 F.
Supp. 507 (E.D. Va. 1980), affd, 649 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that private possession
of cocaine is not a fundamental constitutional right).
8. RANDY BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY 1-2 (1998). As far as America is

concerned, one need look no further than Jean Jacques Burlamaqui's treatise on natural law.
DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING A LOST CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 12

(Cato Institute 2011). Burlamaqui's treatise informed the ideas of Thomas Jefferson, as well
as the other Founding Fathers and American culture in general. Id. According to
Burlamaqui:
As soon as we have acknowledged a Creator, 'tis perfectly visible, that he is a
master, who of himself has a supreme right to lay his commands on man, to
prescribe rules of conduct to him, and to subject him to laws; and 'tis no less
evident, that man on his side finds himself, by his natural constitution, under
an obligation of subjecting his actions to the will of this supreme Being.
JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 133-34 (Thomas Nugent tans.,

The Lawbook Exchange, LTD 2004) (1748). Today, at least one major political party is
moving toward "principles of libertarianism." Becket Adams, New Poll Shows GOP Shifting
in Fascinating New Direction, THE BLAZE (Sep. 11, 2013, 10:13 AM),
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/09/11 /new-poll-shows-republicans-flocking-towardlibertarian-principles/. Such principles are sometimes identified with licentiousness, but
many libertarians, such as author and scholar Randy Barnett, recognize, regarding individual
autonomy, that there is a line between liberty and license. BARNETT, supra note 8, at 1-2.
Liberty, writes Barnett, is the "freedoms which people ought to have," and license "refers to
those freedoms which people ought not to have and thus those freedoms which are properly
constrained." Id. at 2.
9. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). To wit, natural law can be

defined as: "a moral law accessible to all human beings through reason." Hon. Diarmuid F.
O'Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American Tradition,79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1513, 1521

(2011). Put more simply, natural law is God's law. Sir William Blackstone believed man is
commanded to use his reason to determine God's law:
But laws ... in which it is our present business to consider them, denote the
rules, not of action in general, but of human action or conduct: that is, the
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declares that the very purpose of civil government is to secure mans' natural
rights.o When the time came to craft a functioning system of government
from the principles espoused in the Declaration, there was a great debate
over whether it was even necessary to mention these natural rights."
Because natural rights are pre-existing-inherent in man's being-they can
be recognized, but not created.12
Man's right to contract is among these natural rights." As a natural right,
its scope is pre-defined, and cannot be altered by government." Indeed, the

precepts by which man, the noblest of all sublunary beings, a creature endowed
with both reason and freewill, is commanded to make use of those faculties in
the general regulation of his behavior.
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *39.

10. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Natural rights are
"objective rights held by all humans as a matter of moral principle." O'Scannlain, supra note
9, at 1514. Furthermore, natural rights are understood as being granted by God, as
demonstrated by the Declaration of Independence. THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The Declaration proclaims:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creatorwith certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.-That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed[.]
Id. (emphasis added).
11. ARKES, supra note 3, at 51. ("They were the first principles of 'lawfulness,' so
fundamental that few people thought it necessary even to state them."). A great example of
this is the debate over whether or not to include the ex-post facto clause in the Constitution.
Id. at 28. The Founders thought that a ban on ex-post facto laws was so ingrained in civilized
society that restating it was unnecessary. O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 1518 (noting that
"[tihe principle was so obvious, and so widely known, that some Framers thought it was
unnecessary, and almost embarrassing, to declare it in the Constitution as though it were
news.").
12. OVERMAN, supra note 6, at 56 ("Man does not invent these laws, he recognizes them,
accepts them, and lives at peace with them."). "Indeed, when our founders codified
fundamental rights in the Constitution, they did not believe that they were 'creating' those
rights, any more than a mathematician 'creates' mathematical principles when he writes the
axioms of a formal system." O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 1517.
13. The Contract Clause of the Constitution does not establish a right to contract; it
assumes this inherent right and prohibits the States from infringing upon it. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall . .. pass any .. . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.").
14. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at * 39-40. God, wrote Blackstone,
[C]reated man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of
life ... [and] laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that
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law of contracts reflected this premise for much of our nation's history, as it
was tailored to the principles rooted in the common law: a man could not
contract for something immoral or illegal." To properly analyze the scope
of man's right to contract, an appropriate analytical framework should
acknowledge a basic principle long entrenched in the common law-that
man has pre-existing rights given to him by his Creator.16 This principle can
be broken down into two elements for our present purposes. First, the scope
of each natural right is pre-defined. 7 Second, and somewhat redundantly,
the rights themselves cannot be altered or abolished by a majority."
To be clear, this Comment is not proposing that we, as a nation, begin to
enforce natural law." Nor does it suggest that laws are to be disobeyed, or
freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the
faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws.
Id.
15. Hadley Arkes, The Shadow of Natural Rights, or A Guide from the Perplexed, 86
MICH. L. REV. 1492, 1516 (1988) [hereinafter Shadow]. Professor Arkes explains that the
moral scope of the right to contract was not merely esoteric, but actually applied when
adjudicating matters: "The judges who spoke seriously about the 'freedom of contract' were
alert to the moral ground from which that freedom arose." Id.
16. ARKES, supra note 3, at 49. See JOHN LOCKE, I Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, bk.
II, ch. II, § 6 (Thomas Hollis ed., 1764) (1690) ("The state of Nature has a law of Nature to
govern it, which obliges every one [sic]."); BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at * 39 ("Man,
considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his Creator, for he is
entirely a dependent being. ... And consequently, as man depends absolutely upon his
Maker for everything, it is necessary that he should, in all points, conform to his Maker's
will."); BURLAMAQUI, supra note 8, at 125-36; 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA
bk. II. pt. II. Q. 96. art. 5, sed contra (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans.,
Christian Classics 1981) (c. 1265) ("The Apostle says: Let every soul be subject to the higher
powers. But subjection to a power seems to imply subjection to the laws framed by that
power.") (internal citation omitted); CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 6
(Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller & Harold S. Stone eds., 1989) (1748). Montesquieu put it
this way:
Prior to all these laws are the laws of nature, so named because they derive
uniquely from the constitution of our being. . .. The law that impresses on us
the idea of a creator and thereby leads us toward him is the first of the natural
laws in importance, though not first in the order of these laws.
Id.
17. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at * 39.

18. 113 CONG. REc. S1160 (2013) (Sen. Rand Paul filibuster).
19. Indeed, Judge O'Scannlain, himself a believer in natural law, notes that "[e]ven the
jurists who are well-known for believing in the natural law, Justice Clarence Thomas and
Judges Robert Bork and William Pryor, for instance, do not believe that judges have the
authority to enforce it." O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 1515, 1519 (citing Randy E. Barnett,
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are otherwise invalid, if not in conformity with the natural law. 2 0 It seeks to
define neither the scope of all natural rights, nor that of a single natural
right-such as the right to contract. Indeed, the singular purpose of this
Comment is to demonstrate that an understanding of our country's natural
law foundation is of tremendous import when interpreting constitutional
rights, especially those in which the Framers sought to codify a natural
right.
Therefore, this Comment will show that the scope of man's natural
rights, and the rights themselves, are eternal and not subject to redefinition
by a majority. More specifically, the original understanding of a particular
natural right must inform its constitutional counterpart. This remains true
if the natural right-like the right to privacy-was not explicitly codified in
the Constitution. Furthermore, this Comment will show that the scope of
the right to contract is limited by natural law, that the Framers were keen
on this notion, and that the Supreme Court applied this principle for most
of our nation's history. In sum, this Comment proposes that the Court
return to interpreting man's natural rights in light of our Constitutional
Consensus. 21

Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 93, 95 (1995); William H. Pryor, Jr., Christian Duty and the Rule of Law, 34
CUMB. L. REV. 1, 8 (2003); Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or
Immunities Clauseof the FourteenthAmendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 63 (1989)).
20. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment. The inquisitive reader,
however, should see BARNETr, supra note 8, at 12-17 (answering "[whether human law
prescribes acts of all the virtues[?]" and "whether it pertains to human law to repress all
vices[?]" (quoting AQUINAS, supra note 16, at bk. II. pt. II. Q. 94. art. 2)). The reader should
also note that proponents of natural law tend to advocate the notion that freedom requires
virtue, while rejecting the notions that the government has the ability to, or should, impose
morality through the positive law. See ARKEs, supra note 3, at 55-56 (discussing the
constraints on individual liberty that arise from the inherent moral autonomy of man);
Video: Liberty University Convocation (Senator Rand Paul Address Oct. 28, 2013) (available
at http://www.paul.senate.gov/?p=video&id= 1026) (lamenting America's "spiritual crisis").
21. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1, 2 (U.S. 1776). The Declaration's
opening paragraph announced to the world that the American settlers were discontent, and
now former, subjects of British Rule;
WHEN in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to
dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to
assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which
the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel

them to the separation.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. The ConstitutionalConsensus
The Framers of the Constitution were focused on effectuating a workable
system of government that was aligned with the natural law principles
proclaimed in the Declaration.22 They understood that a man could only

Id. The Declaration's second paragraph infamously declares that all men are equal under the
eyes of God, and that all men have intrinsic rights from birth: "We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."
Id. The reason for the separation from England was simple; the Crown would not recognize
its subjects' God-given, or inalienable, rights:
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed,-That whenever any Form
of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People
to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation
on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will
dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and
transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn that mankind are
more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by
abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of
abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design
to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to
throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future
security.-Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is
now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of
Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of
repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment
of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted
to a candid world.

Id.
22. Of our founding Constitutional Consensus, Kevin Ryan, said
Those who settled this country, founded its government, and framed its
Constitution, inherited the teachings of a natural law tradition rooted in both
philosophy and religion. Natural Law provided the background language in
which Americans of all social strata-not only preachers, lawyers, and
statesmen, but merchants and planters as well-could argue about public
purposes, about means and ends, about the many affairs of the nation; it
formed the common sense upon which political and legal claims could be
made. The settlers of America believed that identifiable moral, legal, and
political principles were written in the nature of things, where they were
discoverable by the free exercise of the mind; they believed that it is within the
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govern another man with consent 23 and according to a rule of law 24 that
reconciles with natural law.2 s Scholar John Courtney Murray 26 described
this uniformity of belief in, or reliance upon, particular truths as a
"constitutional consensus." 27 The word, "constitution refers not to a charter
document, but rather to "those cultural factors binding a political society
together, creating the character of the nation." 28 Henry Saint John, Lord
Bolingbroke, the English statesmen and philosopher, concluded that the
laws and customs of a community, which are "derived from certain fixed
principles of reason," evidence a consensus.2 9 Moreover, a Constitutional
Consensus reaches beyond the laws of a community, setting them aside to
analyze the principles, reason, and beliefs upon which the very laws are
founded.o Political philosophers, such as Aristotle, Cicero, and Plato have
native powers of the human intellect, especially when disciplined by logic and
careful reflection on experience, to discover the highest metaphysical truths.
Kevin F. Ryan, Esq., We Hold These Truths, VT. B.J. 9, 11 (Winter 2005-2006).
23. Shadow, supra note 15, at 1512. According to Professor Arkes:
[The] "freedom to contract" was understood, at the beginning, as grounded in
the premises of "natural rights." It began with an understanding of the things
that separated human beings, in nature, from beings that did not have the
competence of moral agents. And it was drawn then from the same premises
that established "government by consent" as the only legitimate from of
government over human beings: No obligations could arise from contracts that
were not entered freely, with the "consent" of the parties; and no arrangements
of government could be binding without establishing the same "consent" on the
part of the governed.
Id.
24. LOCKE, supra note 16, at bk. II, ch. XI, § 137.
25. Id. at bk. II, ch. XI, § 135 ("Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all
men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for other men's actions must, as
well as their own and other men's actions be conformable to the law of nature, i. e. to the will
of God."). As will be explored more thoroughly in this Comment, Locke's work was highly
regarded by the Framers. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
26. In addition to his scholarly work, Murray was also a Jesuit priest. Many of his
published essays discuss the American proposition. Ryan, supra note 22, at 9.
27. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON
THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 9 (1988).
28. Ryan, supra note 22, at 9.
29. Id. (citing Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties,in 2 THE WORKS OF LORD
BOLINGBROKE 88 (Univ. Press of the Pacific 2001) (1841)).
30. MURRAY, supra note 27, at 9 ("The state of civility supposes a consensus that is
constitutional, sc., its focus is the idea of law, as surrounded by the whole constellation of
ideas that are related to the ratio iurisas its premises, its constituent elements, and its

84

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:77

long recognized that this shared set of beliefs is the foundation of social
order.3 1
A Constitutional Consensus is created by "long percolation, by slow,
persistent deliberative exchange by the people as they encounter and reflect
upon the ever-changing circumstances of their political and social world."32
In other words, a constitution is the mind of the people.33 It reflects their
understanding of reality; a common appreciation of the nature of things
accrued through trial and error, prosperity, and adversity.34 Formed this

consequences."). Murray emphasizes that a consensus is neither imposed nor stumbled
upon; "This consensus is come to by the people; they become a people by coming to it. They
do not come to it accidentally, without quite knowing how, but deliberatively, by the
methods of reason reflecting on experience." Id.
31. Ryan, supra note 22, at 9. See generally ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 65 (Stephen Everson ed., 1996) (c. 350 B.C.) ("[O]ne citizen differs
from another, but the salvation of the community is the common business of them all. This
community is the constitution; the excellence of the citizen must therefore be relative to the
constitution of which he is a member." (emphasis added)). Aristotle describes "excellence" as
the "virtues of temperance, courage, justice, and the like." Id. at 28; See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC
186 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Prometheus Books 1986) (c. 360 B.C.) (asking "Can there be
any greater evil than discord and distraction and plurality where unity ought to reign? [O]r
an greater good than the bond of unity? There cannot.").
32. Ryan, supra note 22, at 9.
33. MURRAY, supra note 27, at 9 ("[It is] the constitutional consensus whereby the
people acquires its identity as a people and the society is endowed with its vital form, its
entelechy, its sense of purpose as a collectivity organized for action in history.").
34. See id. at 11.
[The] vitality [of the consensus] depends on a constant scrutiny of political
experience, as this experience widens with the developing-or possibly the
decaying-life of man in society. Only at the price of this continued contact
with experience will a constitutional tradition continue to be "held," as real
knowledge and not simply as a structure of prejudice.
Id. Murray is quick to note, however, that "the consensus[] is not a mere record of
experience. It is experience illumined by principle, given a construction by a process of
philosophical reflection. In the public argument there must consequently be a continued
recurrence to first principles." Id.; see Ryan, supra note 22, at 9. It should be noted that a
consensus is not a sufficient basis for adjudicating rights bestowed by God if that consensus
runs contrary to natural law. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at * 41. As Blackstone proclaimed:
This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is
of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in
all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to
this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority,
mediately or immediately, from this original.
Id.
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way, a constitution becomes a body of substantive truth that means more
than a set of rules or maxims.35 So then, a consensus might be reflected in a
written constitution, but the drafting of documents is not capable of
creating a consensus, nor can it be imposed by a political institution or
process.
Constitutions that do not align with the people's actual consensus,
ultimately, do not function properly.37 Neither charter nor government can
impose fundamental beliefs; they remain outside policy and are the
foundation, which all policy is built upon. 38 Thus, the consensus establishes
a framework under which discourse and debate may operate.39
35. According to Murray,
It is not simply a set of working hypotheses whose value is pragmatic. It is an
ensemble of substantive truths, a structure of basic knowledge, an order of
elementary affirmations that reflect realities inherent in the order of existence.
It occupies an established position in society and excludes opinions alien or
contrary to itself.
MURRAY, supra note 27, at 9.
36. Id.; see JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 7 (Maurice Cranston trans.,
Penguin Books 2006) (1762) ("Since no man has any natural authority over his fellows, and
since force alone bestows no right, all legitimate authority among men must be based on
covenants.").
37. MuRRAY, supra note 27, at 9. See Letter from John Adams, Second President of the
United States, to the Officers of the First Brigade of the Third Division of the Militia of
Massachusetts (Oct. 11, 1798), in IX THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES: WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR 229 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Little, Brown
& Co. 1854)[hereinafter WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS] (noting that "[o]ur Constitution was made
only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any
other."). Similarly, President George Washington said in his Farewell Address to the Nation:
Of all the dispositions and habits, which lead to political prosperity, religion
and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the
tribute of patriotism who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human
happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere
politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A
volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity.
GEORGE WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE

2 (U.S. G.P.O. 2004).
38. See MURRAY, supra note 27, at 9-10. Echoing this notion, Ryan describes a
consensus in this way:
[T]he consensus is composed of a body of substantive truths, accepted by the
people as basic knowledge about the nature of things. . . . The consensus truths
provide the streambed upon which events, policies, and decisions flow, the
solid ground upon which takes place the speech and action that makes up a
people's life together as a nation.
UNITED STATES
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The Declaration of Independence is significant for this very reason.4 0 In
addition to being "the first political act of the American people in their
independent sovereign capacity," the truths which it declared were
momentous.42 "We hold these truths to be self-evident,43 that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of

Ryan, supra note 22, at 9.
39. MURRAY, supra note 27, at 10. Murray rests a society's ability to engage in discourse
on its Constitutional Consensus:
The whole premise of the public argument, if it is to be civilized and civilizing,
is that the consensus is real, that among the people everything is not in doubt,
but that there is a core of agreement, accord, concurrence, acquiescence. We
hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them.
Id. Furthering this point, Ryan notes,
[p]recisely because [the Constitutional Consensus] stands outside of policy,
providing a means by which to test the ends of government against basic
principles, the consensus becomes the ground on which communication
between government and the people, and among the people themselves, can
and should occur. It offers a common universe of discourse in which public
issues can be intelligibly stated and intelligently debated.
Ryan, supra note 22, at 9.
40. MURRAY, supra note 27, at 28 (labeling the Declaration a "landmark of Western
political theory"). Murray believes the Declaration's significance is found within its
principles, which "radically distinguishes the conservative Christian tradition of America
from the Jacobin laicist tradition of Continental Europe." Id.
41. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 115-16 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
42. MuRRAY, supra note 27, at 28-29. Murray highlights the significance of America's
Constitutional Consensus, found within the text of the Declaration of Independence:
[T]he first article of the American political faith is that the political community,
as a form of free and ordered human life, looks to the sovereignty of God as to
the first principle of its organization. In the Jacobin tradition religion is at best
a purely private concern, a matter of personal devotion, quite irrelevant to
public affairs. Society as such, and the state which gives it legal form, and the
government which is its organ of action are by definition agnostic or atheist.
The statesman as such cannot be a believer, and his actions as a statesman are
immune from any imperative or judgment higher than the will of the people, in
whom resides ultimate and total sovereignty (one must remember that in the
Jacobin tradition "the people" means "the party"). This whole manner of
thought is altogether alien to the authentic American tradition.

Id.
43. This does not mean it must be obvious to everyone, but merely must be true in itself.
See AQUINAS, supra note 16, at bk. I. pt. II. Q.94, art. 4, sed contra (noting that truth may be
"the same for all, but is not equally known to all").
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Happiness."" This statement is simple but powerful." Considering also that
the Declaration champions "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God"4 6 and
"unalienable Rights" endowed by a Creator," it is inescapable that our
Constitutional Consensus was premised upon natural law.4 8 The peripheral
writings of the Framers lend credence to the notion that both this founding
document and, later, the Constitution were drafted upon the understanding
that the country would be governed by the rule of law established by natural
law."

44. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
45. See generally Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 115-16 (Field, J.
dissenting) (discussing the nature of the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness). Justice Field described the significance of the statement this way:
[T]he Declaration of Independence, which was the first political act of the
American people in their independent sovereign capacity, lays the foundation
of our National existence upon this broad proposition: 'That all men are
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' Here
again we have the great threefold division of the rights of freemen, asserted as
the rights of man. Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are
equivalent to the rights of life, liberty, and property. These are the fundamental
rights which can only be taken away by due process of law, and which can only
be interfered with, or the enjoyment of which can only be modified, by lawful
regulations necessary or proper for the mutual good of all; and these rights, I
contend, belong to the citizens of every free government.
Id.
46. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). The Founders understood
the Laws of Nature and Nature's God to be "law[s] that God imposes on all men, and which

they are able to discover and know by the sole light of reason, and by attentively considering
their state and nature." BURLAMAQUI, supra note 8, at 126.
47. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
48. MURRAY, supra note 27, at 29-30 (explaining that the "first principle" of our
Constitutional Consensus is "the sovereignty of God over society as well as over individual
men ... "). See Ryan, supra note 22, at 9, 11 ("Rather than a set of unanchored beliefs, our
[Constitutional Consensus] is an attempt to assert a set of truths, truths that grow out of the
'Laws of Nature and of Nature's God."' (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S.
1776))).

49. MuRRAY, supra note 27, at 28-33. This concept was established in the Declaration of
Independence when the Founders justified their decision to become a new nation abiding by
the "Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them." THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). Similarly, the Honorable Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, points out that, despite not directly
appealing to the natural law, as did the Declaration, the Constitution uses "terms which
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1. Self-Evident Truths
The Founders labeled the proposition that "all men are created equal" as
a "self-evident" truth. 0 They understood this truth to be eternal; the very
type of truth that Saint Thomas Aquinas, the philosopher and theologian,
determined must be true in itself." In other words, an eternal truth,
52
Aquinas remarked, is "the same for all, but ... not equally known to all."
Aquinas used geometry to fashion an example: "[I]t is true for all that the
three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it
is not known to all."53
Alexander Hamilton began the Federalist No. 31 with a stark and
stunning examination of the nature of eternal truths, or what he labeled
"first principles":
In disquisitions of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or
first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must
depend. These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to
all reflection or combination, commands the assent of the mind.
Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from
cannot be understood apart from the natural law tradition from which they were plucked."
O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 1517.
50. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). Of this equality, Professor
Arkes explains:
[I]f one began with that sense of where humans stand in the rankings of nature,
it was plausible to take the next step and draw the inference made by Locke,
Rousseau, and the men who framed the American republic: that the inequalities
which stand out so plainly in nature reveal, quite dramatically, the attributes in
which human beings as a species must be regarded as equal by nature.
HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
JUSTICE 34 (1986) [hereinafter First Things]. The Professor goes on to explain how this
inherent equality gives rise to the polity, or in the case of America, the republic; if a man has

power over another man, it must be through consent:
The understanding could be expressed in this way: no man can be, by nature,
the ruler of other men in the same way that God is by nature the ruler of men,
and men are by nature the rulers of dogs, horses, and monkeys. Therefore, if a
situation has come about in which some men have been placed in the position
of exercising power over others, that situation could not have arisen
from nature. It had to arise from convention or agreement; it had to arise, one
might say, from consent.

Id. at 34-35.
51. AQUINAS, supra note 16, at bk. I. pt. II. Q.94, art. 2, sed contra.
52. Id. at bk. I. pt. II. Q.94, art. 4, sed contra.
53. Id.
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some disorder in the organs of perception, or from the influence
of some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice. Of this nature
are the maxims in geometry, that the whole is greater than its
part; that things equal to the same, are equal to one another; that
two straight lines cannot inclose a space; and that all right angles
are equal to each other. Of the same nature are these other
maxims in ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect
without a cause; that the means ought to be proportioned to the
end; that every power ought to be commensurate with its object;
that there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect
a purpose which is itself incapable of limitation. And there are
other truths in the two latter sciences, which, if they cannot
pretend to rank in the class of axioms, are such direct inferences
from them, and so obvious in themselves, and so agreeable to the
natural and unsophisticated dictates of common sense, that they
challenge the assent of a sound and unbiased mind, with a degree
of force and conviction almost equally irresistible."
The nature of eternal truths is a perpetual existence, regardless of
knowledge, insistence, or ideology, and demonstrates that those truths are
deductive rather than inductive." An inductive principle cannot be eternal
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 31 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added). Professor Arkes
explains "first principles" in this way:
[N]ecessary truths ... must be understood before we are capable of
understanding other things. They cannot be "demonstrated" in the sense of
carrying out an experiment, because if these truths are not understood, anterior
to experiments or "experience," we would have no basis on which to
understand the experience. But when we speak in this way of propositions that
must be grasped as necessary before we can know anything else-before we can
know "secondary" truths-we are speaking, in the strictest sense, of "first
principles."
FIRST THINGS, supra note 50, at 52.
55. ARKEs, supra note 3, at 58. According to the dictionary,
Deductive and inductive refer to two distinct logical processes. Deductive
reasoning is a logical process in which a conclusion drawn from a set of
premises contains no more information than the premises taken collectively.
All dogs are animals; this is a dog; therefore, this is an animal: The truth of the
conclusion is dependent only on the method. All men are apes; this is a man;
therefore, this is an ape: The conclusion is logically true, although the premise is
absurd. Inductive reasoning is a logical process in which a conclusion is
proposed that contains more information than the observations or experience
on which it is based. Every crow ever seen was black; all crows are black: The
truth of the conclusion is verifiable only in terms of future experience and

90

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:77

and, therefore, cannot be considered truth."6 For an inductive proposition is
based upon experience; thus, it can only accumulate information and
propose a generalization or probability. 7 It is not possible to experience an
eternal truth; "experience . .. informs us only what is, or has been, not of
what must be[.]""
2. Constitutional Republic
Upon exiting Independence Hall, following the successful Constitutional
Convention, in Philadelphia, during the summer of 1787, a woman
approached Benjamin Franklin and asked what type of government the
delegates had created. 9 To the crowd's surprise, 6 Dr. Franklin announced
"a Republic, if you can keep it."61 The distinction between republic and
democracy is not merely an esoteric debate-it truly matters.
A democracy is, effectively, majority rule.62 In fact, there's an old saying
that democracy is 'two wolves and a sheep deciding what to have for
lunch.' As Senator Rand Paul noted in his filibuster of John Brennan's
nomination for director of the CIA on March 6, 2013, "with majority rule

certainty is attainable only if all possible instances have been examined. In the
example, there is no certainty that a white crow will not be found tomorrow,
although past experience would make such an occurrence seem unlikely.
(last visited Dec. 16,
DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/deductive?s=t
2012).
56. ARKES, supra note 3, at 57.
57. Id. at 57-58 ("If 'all men are created equal' were really an inductive proposition, it
would have to be recast as 'Most men are created equal, most of the time."').
58. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) ("Though it should be found by experience in
a thousand cases, that the area of a plane triangle is equal to the rectangle under the altitude
and half the base, this would not prove that it must be so in all cases, and cannot be
otherwise[.]" (quoting THOMAS REID, ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN (1969))).
This is not to say that truths are not eternal, but that truth is eternal independent of our
experience. Id.
59. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 85 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS].
60. 113 CONG. REc. S1160 (2013) (Sen. Rand Paul filibuster). Senator Paul suggests the
people expected the new government to be either a monarchy or a democracy. Id.
61. FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 59, at 85.
62. 113 CONG. REc. S1160 (2013) (Sen. Rand Paul filibuster).
63. This quote is often attributed to Benjamin Franklin, although it does not appear in
his known writings. See generally BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, SELECTIONS (J.A. Leo Lemay ed.,
1997).
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... you set yourself up for a diminishment of rights."' This echoes the
convictions of James Madison, Father of the Constitution:
[A] pure democracy ... can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of
faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case,
be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert
results from the form of government itself; and there is nothing
to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an
obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have
ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever
been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of
property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they
have been violent in their deaths."5
In a republic, on the other hand, citizens hold the power; they are entitled to
vote and elect representatives who are constrained by a rule of law.66 A
republic "is a nonmonarchical system that makes no claim to . . . embody

the will of the people; it is a system merely for the appointment of leaders
and the administration of law."" Indeed, Madison declared that a
republican form of government, borrowed from the Romans 6 was
America's "cure. 69
,

"

64. 113 CONG. REC. S1161 (2013) (Sen. Rand Paul filibuster) (noting that majorities
passed Jim Crow laws, which discriminated against people based on skin color). Senator
Paul's father, former Congressman Ron Paul, argues in his book Liberty Defined that this
affect has come to pass in America. "[Tihe slogan ["]democracy["] has come to mean
domestically ... that the government prevails over the people by claiming the blessing of
mass opinion" when it was intended to mean that "the people prevail over the government."
RON PAUL, LIBERTY DEFINED: 50 ESSENTIAL ISSUES THAT AFFECT OUR FREEDOM 63-64 (2012).
65. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). Dr. Paul argues that these threats still exist

today. "The difference between a democracy and a republic is important. Pure democracy, in
which the law itself is up for grabs based on legislative maneuvering, is the enemy of
individual rights, and it victimizes the minority. [Such authority is] every bit as harmful as a
single dictator." PAUL, supra note 64, at 65. Dr. Paul notes that this "'democratic mandate' is
more seductive since the people too often are conditioned to accept the notion that as long as
the consensus of 51 percent agree, something is morally acceptable." Id.
66. PAUL, supra note 64, at 65.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 63.
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). Madison went on to write that a republic
serves:
[T]o refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium
of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest
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3. Founding Influences
To understand what America's founding fathers believed, an
examination of what, or whom, they were reading is critical.o The three
authors most quoted by the Founders are John Locke, Sir William
Blackstone, and Baron de Montesquieu;71 therefore, knowledge of the truths
upon which they approached philosophy and political science aids in a
comprehensive understanding of the Founders' assumptions regarding civil
jurisdiction.72 Indeed, John Locke was referenced most by the Founders
when their most prevalent concern was "independence and the rights of
man," while Blackstone and Montesquieu were most cited whilst the
Founders were "forming a government to secure those rights."7
All three men published works contemporaneously with the founding of
America; John Locke's Two Treatises of Government, which was "the primer
on just government at the time of the Nation's founding,"7 was published
in the late Seventeenth Century. In Locke's writings there is great
of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to
sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation it
may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of
the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by
the people themselves, convened for the purpose.
Id.
70. CYNTHIA N. DUNBAR, ONE NATION UNDER GOD 12-13 (2008) ("To read these
authors' writings, which were fairly contemporaneous to our country's founding, is to obtain
a clear vision of the underlying belief systems our Founders possessed concerning civil
jurisdiction."). Chief Justice John Marshall explained the relevance of scholars and
philosophers who wrote prior to the Nation's founding:
When we advert to the course of reading generally pursued by American
statesmen in early life, we must suppose, that the framers of our constitution
were intimately acquainted with the writings of those wise and learned men,
whose treatises on the laws of nature and nations have guided public opinion
on the subjects of obligation and contract.
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 353-54 (1827). Although the Chief Justice
singles out contract law as having been influenced, it is certain that these men influenced
America's entire Constitutional Consensus.
71. Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Importance of European Writers on Late Eighteenth
Century American PoliticalThought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 189, 193-94 (1984).

72. DUNBAR, supra note 70, at 13.
73. JOHN EIDSMOE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 53 (1987).

74. Douglas W. Kmiec & John 0. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the
OriginalUnderstanding,14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 527 (1987).
75. DUNBAR, supra note 70, at 13.
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emphasis on the Law of Nature, which Locke considered to be the will of
God."6 Positive law, Locke believed, was "ill made" unless drafted
"according to the general laws of nature, and without contradiction to any
positive law of scripture."n
Sir William Blackstone, who is renowned for his Commentaries on the
Laws of England," asserted natural law more aggressively than Locke did as
the cornerstone for any positive law." Indeed, the Founders "drew three
major points from Blackstone," the first being that God is the source of all
law." The second point was that judges merely apply the law-they do not
create the law; and the third was Blackstone's "systematizing" of England's
Common Law." It should be noted here that the Common Law of England
was based upon Biblical principles and was integral to the Christian heritage
of America, a reality that, but for Blackstone, might not be.8 2
That Christian heritage was further nurtured by Baron de Montesquieu's
The Spirit of the Laws, which recognizes God as the authority of all law." He

76. See id.
77. LOCKE, supra note 16, at bk. II, ch. XI, § 136 (quoting

RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE

LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY (1593)).

78. Scholar John Eidsmoe notes:
Throughout the latter half of the 1700s and the first half of the 1800s
Blackstone's popularity in America was uneclipsed. It is said that more copies
of Blackstone's Commentaries were sold in American than in England, that his
Commentaries were in the offices of every lawyer in the land, that candidates
for the bar were routinely examined on Blackstone, that he was cited
authoritatively in the courts, and that a quotation from Blackstone settled many
a legal argument.
EIDSMOE, supra note 73, at 57 (citing Lutz, supra note 71, at 195-96).
79. DUNBAR, supra note 70, at 14.
80. EIDSMOE, supra note 73, at 57.
81. Id. at 58-59.
82. Id. at 59-60.
83. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 16, at 3. Montesquieu opines that:
God is related to the universe, as creator and preserver; the laws according to
which he created are those according to which he preserves; he acts according
to these rules because he knows them; he knows them because he made them;
he made them because they are related to his wisdom and power.
Id. at 3. Thus, writes Montesquieu:
Particular intelligent beings can have laws that they have made, but they also
have some that they have not made. Before there were intelligent beings, they
were possible; therefore, they had possible relations and consequently possible
laws. Before laws were made, there were possible relations of justice. To say that
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also colored his understanding of both man's nature and existence with
scripture; Man, he wrote, "constantly violates the laws [G]od has
established."" To counter man's fallen nature, Montesquieu proposed a
system of checks and balances among three branches of government, based
upon Isaiah 32:22, which was adopted by the Founders to structure
America's Republic." Sir Edward Coke, another scholar who heavily
impacted the Founders' Constitutional Consensus, similarly wrote of
natural law, "The [1]aw of [niature is that which God at ... creation of the
nature of man infused into his heart, for his preservation and direction; and
this is lex aeterna, the [m]oral [f]aw, called also the [1]aw of [n]ature .. .
written with the finger of God in the heart of man ... before that [l]aw was
written by Moses.""6
In addition to the influence of these three philosophers, the drafter of the
Declaration-Thomas Jefferson-studied the works of Lord Bolingbroke."
To be sure, most historians credit Lord Bolingbroke for the Jeffersonian
phrase that appears in the Declaration, "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's
God."" To understand what Jefferson meant by the phrase then, we must
look to its origin. Lord Bolingbroke, in an infamous letter to Alexander
Pope, wrote: "You will find that it is the modest, not the presumptuous
inquirer who makes a real, and safe progress in the discovery of divine
there is nothing just or unjust but what positive laws ordain or prohibit is to say
that before a circle was drawn, all its radii were not equal.
Id. at 4.
84. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 16, at 5. Montesquieu believed man to be intelligent, but
limited:
As an intelligent being, [man] constantly violates the laws god has established
and changes those he himself establishes ... he is a limited being; he is subject
to ignorance and error, as are all finite intelligences; he loses even the imperfect
knowledge he has.... [And he] falls subject to a thousand passions.
Id. See also Jeremiah 17:9 ("The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately sick; who
can understand it?").
85. See generally U.S. CONST. Montesquieu's concept of checks and balances, which
made three co-equal branches accountable to the rule of law, was not designed for the
purpose of perfecting republican government; rather, it was designed to "remedy ... the
concern that mankind left to itself was incapable of selfless and altruistic governing."
DUNBAR, supra note 70, at 15-16.
86. SIR EDWARD COKE, CALVIN'S CASE, OR THE CASE OF THE POSTNATI (1608), reprinted in
THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE 1, 195 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
87. ALLEN JAYNE, JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 19 (1998). Jefferson
quotes Bolingbroke extensively in his Literary Commonplace Book. Id. at 20.
88. See id. at 40.
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truths. One follows nature, and nature's God, that is, he follows God in his
works, and in his word[.]"" To Lord Bolingbroke, and therefore the
Founders, the law of nature's God was found in the Bible-God's Word.
The Declaration of Independence champions these "Laws of Nature and
of Nature's God" as authority to dissolve our ties to England," and the
Constitution is an effort to codify them.9 ' Thus, these two documents are
inter-related-the Constitution is the framework for implementing the
Declaration's principles.92 Early in the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court recognized that "it is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution
in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence."9 3 President Lincoln
echoed this observation-quoting Proverbs 25:11, Lincoln opined that "[a]
word fitly spoken is like an apple of gold in a frame of silver."" According
to Lincoln, the Declaration's natural law presumption is the apple, or
substance, of the law, and the Constitution is the schema for fulfillment;
that is, the Constitution was intended to achieve our Constitutional
Consensus, discussed above."
89. Bolingbroke, Letters or Essays Addressed to Alexander Pope, Esq., in 3 THE WORKS OF
LORD BOLINGBROKE 62 (Univ. Press of the Pacific 2001) (1841).
90.

Book Note, The Role of Natural Law in the American Revolution, 108 HARV. L. REv.

1202, 1206 (1995) (noting that "[tihe colonists based their decision to seek independence on
their conclusion that the entire legitimacy of positive law and legal rights relied upon
conformity with natural rights." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
91. O'Scannlain, supranote 9, at 1528.
92. Id. at 1517.

93. Cotting v. Godard, 183 U.S. 79, 107 (1901). The full passage reads:
The first official action of this nation declared the foundation of government in
these words: 'We hold these truths to be selfevident [sic], that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' While
such declaration of principles may not have the force of organic law, or be
made the basis of judicial decision as to the limits of right and duty, and while
in all cases reference must be had to the organic law of the nation for such
limits, yet the latter is but the body and the letter of which the former is the
thought and the spirit, and it is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution
in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. No duty rests more
imperatively upon the courts than the enforcement of those constitutional
provisions intended to secure that equality of rights which is the foundation of
free government.
Id.
94.

MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC: STUDIES IN THE FOUNDATION

OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 13 (1996).

95. See supra Part II.A.
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Theories of Contract

Although the right to contract is both a natural right and fundamental to
individual liberty, the Supreme Court has altered both its scope and remedy
over the last two centuries.16 One significant way the Framers incorporated
the Declaration's natural law principles into the Constitution was by
instituting the Constitution itself-simply put, Constitutionalism
establishes the rule of law." The Contract Clause of Article I, discussed
below," further exemplifies this commitment to the rule of law.99 Prior to
the ratification of the Constitution, the right to contract had long been
recognized as pre-existing government-a natural right.100 The Framers
sought to codify this natural right with an express prohibition on the
impairment of contracts. 01 By codifying the pre-existing right to contract,
the Framers also acknowledged the right's pre-existing limitations. 0 2
96. K.M. Sharma, From "Sanctity" to "Fairness":An Uneasy Transition in the Law of
Contracts?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 95, 95-97 (1999); James W. Ely, Jr., The
Protection of Contractual Rights: A Tale of Two Constitutional Provisions, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 370, 371 (2005).
97. MURRAY, supra note 27, at 32. Indeed, Murray explains the Constitution's
significance in this way:
Through the American techniques of the constitutional convention and of
popular ratification, the American Constitution is explicitly the act of the
people. It embodies their consensus as to the purposes of government, its
structure, the extent of its powers and the limitations on them, etc. By the
Constitution the people define the areas where authority is legitimate and the
areas where liberty is lawful. The Constitution is therefore at once a charter of
freedom and a plan for political order.
Id. at 33-32.
98. See infra Part II.B.1.
99. See generally Shadow, supra note 15, at 1512. Professor Arkes explains the rule of law
inherent in the Contract Clause this way:
A promise may be binding only when it is accepted, freely, without coercionwhen it is accepted, that is, with the 'consent' of the contracting party. In other
words, this 'freedom to contract' was understood, at the beginning, as
grounded in the premises of 'natural rights.' It began with an understanding of
the things that separated human beings, in nature, from beings that did not
have the competence of moral agents.
Id. As discussed later in this Comment, the Contract Clause yielded the 'freedom of contract'
doctrine. See discussion infra Part II.B.l.
100. See Shadow, supra note 15, at 1512.
101. Id. at 1514 (noting that before and after the American Revolution, "the
understanding of the time [was] that the right to enter into contracts, and to be bound only
by consent, was not merely a 'conventional' right, but a 'natural' right."). To this end, James
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Initially, the Contract Clause spurred frequent and vehement litigation;103
the issue usually being whether a State could burden an existing contract.'"
After nearly a century, the Court set aside' this doctrine and began
analyzing contracts under the Liberty of Contract Doctrine.0 6 The
Fourteenth Amendment, which was adopted in 1868, spurred this
change.'o
The Fourteenth Amendment was drafted in the spirit of the Declaration
and our Constitutional Consensus;o" its Privileges and Immunities

Madison noted in The FederalistPapers, "laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are
contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound
legislation." THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison).
102. See O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 1517-19; Shadow, supra note 15, at 1516. Professor
Arkes asserts that the Framers codified the natural scope of the right to contract that is
bound to a moral autonomy. Id. This is evidenced by the fact that it was still impossible to
contract for immoral things. Id. As noted above, first principles are "primary truths ... upon
which all subsequent reasonings must depend." THE FEDERALIST No. 31 (Alexander
Hamilton). The Framers demonstrated in the Declaration of Independence, the
Constitution, and individual publications, such as the Federalist, their commitment to
natural law principles. See discussion supra Part II.A.
103. Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 74, at 535 ("For the first eighty years, the Contract
Clause appears to have generated more Supreme Court cases than any other constitutional
provision-reflecting the original importance of the Clause."). See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) 87, 123 (1810); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 123 (1819);
Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 518 (1819); Ogden v.
Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 215 (1827); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603,
623 (1869).
104. Ely, supra note 96, at 372.
105. "Set aside" here means that the Court no longer analyzed contractual issues under
this doctrine, not that the doctrine was affected in any way.
106. MAYER, supra note 8, at 1; Ely, supra note 96, at 371. According to Mayer:
Exercising its power of judicial review, the Court declared unconstitutional
various state and federal laws that abridged [the liberty of contract] by denying
individuals the freedom to bargain over the terms of their own contractsmaximum-hours laws, minimum-wage laws, business-licensing laws, housingsegregation laws, and compulsory-education laws-laws that interfered with
individuals' liberty of contract in each of the above-mentioned cases.
MAYER, supra note 8, at 1 (citation omitted).
107. Ely, supra note 96, at 371.
108. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 105 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting)
("[The Fourteenth A]mendment was intended to give practical effect to the declaration of
1776 of inalienable rights, rights which are the gift of the Creator, which the law does not
confer, but only recognizes.").
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Clause" "significantly altered our system of government," by incorporating
the Bill of Rights and all natural rights against the States.' Nevertheless, the
eminence of the Privileges Clause was short-lived. In 1872, the SlaughterHouse Cases decision significantly narrowed the scope of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause."' Had it not been for this decision, the Liberty of
Contract Doctrine might have been expressly limited by natural law
principles. Instead, the Court opted to read substantive, unenumerated
rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. This
jurisprudence became known as substantive due process,11 2 a doctrine that
greatly expanded the scope of "liberty.""
The Court's analytical evolution regarding contract law was a response to
American society's elevation of individual autonomy in contracting."4 The
primary issue litigated under the Liberty of Contract Doctrine was not
whether a State had the ability to burden an existing contract-as it was
with Freedom of Contract; rather, the issue was whether the individual
parties were able to enter into the contract in the first place."'
1. The Contract Clause and Obligation of Contract
The Contract Clause, found within Section Ten of Article I, is significant
in that it is one of a few constitutional prohibitions on the rights of
individuals, as opposed to the federal government."' 6 It is also one of the
109. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
110. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3060 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). See also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 105-06 (Field, J.,
dissenting) (describing the significance of the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
111. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79 (concluding that 'privileges and
immunities' meant those "which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National
character, its Constitution, or its laws").
112. Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURo L. REv. 1501, 1501-10
(1999) (discussing the nature and history of substantive due process jurisprudence).
113. ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, GOD AND MAN IN THE LAW 66-68 (1997). Clinton argues
that liberty of contract and the Court's zone of privacy protections, both substantive due
process doctrines, "can be read to support legal or constitutional protection for almost
anything" and are based upon "a virtually nonexistent constitutional and historical
foundation." Id. at 67.
114. SHARMA, supra note 96, at 96-97 ("At the heart of these manifold changes has been
the much-vaunted sanctity of individual autonomy in contracting, an offshoot of the liberal
notion of freedom of contract, which was the ideological backbone for the development of
the law of contract.").
115. Ely, supra note 96, at 383.
116. Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 74, at 525.
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rare prohibitions imposed upon the States."' On these observations, it can
be concluded that "the [Contract] Clause was clearly of significance to the
Framers."""
The Contract Clause provides, in relevant part, "No State shall ... pass
any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .. . .""' Interpreted

correctly,'20 the Clause prohibits all legislation that retrospectively infringes
vested contractual rights by shifting the benefit of a bargain among parties
to the contract.'2 ' It is ultimately concerned with prospectivity-a principle
inherent in the rule of law.'22 In this way, the Framers sought to implement
the natural law by establishing a rule of law.'23 Furthermore, it was

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
120. Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 74, at 526. According to Kmiec and McGinnis,
[Mlost fundamentally, the interpretation of the Contract Clause as a
prohibition against retrospective interference with contracts comports with the
ideal of government that the Framers actually possessed: namely, a government
constrained by a concept of the rule of law, restrained in circumstances which
present particular risks of majoritarian disregard for minority rights, and
rendered stable by barriers against abrupt change in social policy and
organization.
Id.
121.

Id.

122. Id. at 528 ("Prospectivity is an essential requirement of the rule of law because only
prospective laws allow citizens to plan their conduct so as to conform to the law."). Professor
Hayek explained "prospectivity" to mean "that [the] government in all its actions is bound by
rules fixed and announced beforehand- rules which make it possible to foresee with fair
certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan
one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge." F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM
80 (University of Chicago Press 1994) (1944). Hayek also argued that "[n]othing
distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free country from those in a country under
arbitrary government than the observance in the former of the great principles known as the
Rule of Law." Id.
123. See MURRAY, supra note 27, at 32-33; LOcKE, supra note 16, at bk. II, ch VI, § 57
(claiming "Liberty ... cannot be, where there is not Law"). As noted above, Locke's Two
Treatises was of tremendous influence at the birth of our Nation. See discussion supra Part
II.A. Locke maintained that "the rule of law was a presupposition of liberty in a civil society."
Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 74, at 527. Furthermore, Locke defined "liberty" as one's
ability to live "within the allowance of those Laws under which he is...." LocKE, supra note
16, at bk. II, ch. VI, § 57. Apparent to the Founders, then, was that one must have knowledge
of a law in order to conform to it, and "one cannot know what does not exist." Kmiec &
McGinnis, supra note 74, at 527.
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understood that this achievement depended upon the nation having "settled
standinglaws,"124 which are "general, prospective, and relatively stable."12 5
The Marshall Court provided the original judicial understanding of the
Contract Clause' 2 6-an understanding that demonstrated the Court's
appreciation of the right to contract's status as a natural right."' Decided in
1810, Fletcher v. Peck'28 exemplifies the recurring themes of Chief Justice

124. LOCKE, supra note 16, at bk. II, ch. XI, § 137. As Kmiec and McGinnis noted, "[t]he
task of the Framers was to translate this basic postulate of just government into rules of
practical application by which governing power could be restrained from departing from
'settled standing Laws' and injuring interests which were created in reliance on such laws."
Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 74, at 527.
125. Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 74, at 527.
126. Id. at 535 (noting that the first significant opinion in which the Clause was
interpreted, and many thereafter, was handed down during the Marshall Court's tenure).
127. CLINTON, supra note 113, at 39 (noting that "[n]atural law ... was never an explicit,
generally acknowledged source of constitutionally justiciable principles for the Court; it was
rather a collection of highly general theoretical principles that were no doubt subscribed to
by almost everyone.").
128. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). The controversy in Fletcher began,
after the Georgia Legislature revoked land grants which were made under the Yazoo Land
Act of 1795. Id. at 87-91. Fletcher purchased a tract of land from John Peck, who had
purchased the land from the original grantee under the Act. Id. at 87-88. Fletcher sued Peck
for breach of contract upon the Legislature's invalidation of the 1795 Act, as this voided all
subsequent transactions, including Fletcher's purchase from Peck. Id. at 87-90. The issue
was whether the Georgia Legislature could retroactively revoke the grant by repealing the
1795 Act. Id. at 136 ("The constitution of the United States declares that no state shall pass
any ... law impairing the obligation of contracts. Does the case now under consideration
come within this prohibitory section of the constitution?"). Chief Justice Marshall's rationale
centered upon the plain language of the Clause, noting that the terms "are general, and are
applicable to contracts of every description." Id. at 137. The opinion declared that, by these
general terms, the Clause must apply to contracts between private citizens as well as
sovereigns, such as States. Id. Chief Justice Marshall applied America's Constitutional
Consensus in deciding this issue:
Whatever respect might have been felt for the state sovereignties, it is not to be
disguised that the framers of the constitution viewed, with some
apprehension, the violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the
moment; and that the people of the United States, in adopting that instrument,
have manifested a determination to shield themselves and their property from
the effects of those sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed. The
restrictions on the legislative power of the states are obviously founded in this
sentiment; and the constitution of the United States contains what may be
deemed a bill of rights for the people of each state.
Id. at 137-38.
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Marshall's Contract Clause analysis.' 29 Generally, the Marshall Court
construed the term 'contract' broadly;' this prohibited almost every
impairment of contract argued before its bench and applied the Clause to
contracts of both public and private nature."'
Chief Justice Marshall's only dissent was in Ogden v. Saunders,'3 2 which
also revolved around the Contract Clause.'
Holding to natural law
principles and America's Constitutional Consensus, the Chief Justice
argued that any law, retrospective or prospective, that impairs the right to
contract is unconstitutional.'" He reasoned that:
[I]ndividuals do not derive from government their right to
contract, but bring that right with them into society; that
obligation is not conferred on contracts by positive law, but is
intrinsic, and is conferred by the act of the parties. This results
from the right which every man retains to acquire property, to
dispose of that property according to his own judgment, and to
pledge himself for a future act. These rights are not given by
society, but are brought into it. 3 5
That is, Chief Justice Marshall believed that the right to contract is a natural
right, and each party's obligation under the contract arose from and was
subject to a higher law." 6 Nevertheless, the Majority disagreed, holding that:

129. Id.
130. Id. Chief Justice Marshall believed that grants and corporate charters were contracts,
and analyzed all executed conveyances under the Contract Clause. Id.

131. Id.
132. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
133. Id. at 254 (framing the issue as "whether the obligation of a contract is impaired by a
State bankrupt or insolvent law, which discharges the person and the future acquisitions of
the debtor from his liability under a contract entered into in that State after the passage of
the act?").
134. Id. at 354 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) ("The propositions we have endeavoured to
maintain, of the truth of which we are ourselves convinced, are these: That the words of the
clause in the constitution which we are considering, taken in their natural and obvious sense,
admit of a prospective, as well as of a retrospective, operation." (emphasis added)).
135. Id. at 346.
136. Id. Philosophers often theorize about man's state of nature, which means nothing
more than a period prior to governments and laws. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 140
(Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge University Press 1996) (1651) (discussing the state of "mere
Nature" prior to all laws).
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The obligation of the contract is not the contract itself, but
something arising out of it. The moral obligation is that which
binds the conscience only. The legal obligation is that which the
law imposes. It binds the contracting party to do that which the
law says he shall do, under certain contingencies which may
arise. There is nothing of mere human institution (and it is with
this that the constitution deals) which binds to the performance
of any contract, except the laws under which that contract is
made, and the remedies provided by them to enforce its
execution.'
According to the Majority, but for the positive law, contracting individuals
would only have a moral obligation to perform; the positive law necessarily
imposes obligations and provides a means for remedying a breach.' The
evidence for this, rationalized the Majority, is the lack of restrictions upon
contracting parties in the state of nature.'39 That is, the positive law
determines at what age an individual may legally contract and under what
circumstances a divorce may be obtained-to the majority, this supported
the proposition that obligation of contract is a "positive rule of society."'40
While Chief Justice Marshall's beliefs were not aligned with the majority
in Saunders, the Marshall Court did apply natural law principles to its
jurisprudence.' Indeed, Justice Marshall applied these principles in many
of the cases brought before the Court, including those litigating the freedom
of contract.'42 The majority in Saunders rejected the principle that the
freedom of contract was not and could never be granted by the State; this
137. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) at 234-35 (emphasis added). To the point that
obligation of contract is because the positive law determines it is, the Majority said:
Every municipal code contains a provision determining at what age a person
shall be deemed capable of contracting, and the period of majority is different
under different systems of law. This is a positive rule of society. In a state of
nature, there is no definite age at which an individual becomes capable of
contracting. Is not the whole of this subject under the control of State
legislation; and would a law, extending the period of minority, be said to be a
law impairing the obligation of contracts?
Id. at 236.
138. Id. at 234-35.
139. Id. at 236.
140. Id.
141. Shadow, supra note 15, at 1513-14.
142. Id. (noting specifically Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), Saunders,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat) at 213 (1827), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
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played a crucial role in the outcome of another case decided by the CourtWorcester v. Georgia.1 13
In Worcester, Samuel Worcester entered Cherokee Territory as a
missionary in order to live amongst the Indians and preach the Gospel."
Worcester was arrested and indicted for failing to comply with a Georgia
law that required visitors to the Cherokee Territory to obtain a license from
the governor of Georgia in order to enter or live there.145 In the majority
opinion authored by Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court held that the
Georgia law was unconstitutional and examined the Indians' relationship
with the British in conjunction with its conclusion.'4 6 The Chief Justice
recalled a victorious British government that won a war against the Indians,
not by conquering the Indians, nor by taking their land."' Instead, the
British strategy was to acquire land that the Indians wished to sell through
purchase contracts."' As Professor Arkes notes, the Marshall Court
understood that the British had demonstrated deference to natural law
principles"' and therefore applied these same principles to Worcester.5 o

143. Id. at 1513; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
144. Worcester,31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 538.
145. Id. at 539. The Act at issue required:
'[AIll white persons, residing within the limits of the Cherokee nation on the
1st day of March next, or at any time thereafter, without a license or permit
from his excellency the governor, or from such agent as his excellency the
governor shall authorise to grant such permit or license, and who shall not have
taken the oath hereinafter required, shall be guilty of a high misdemeanour,
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by confinement to the
penitentiary, at hard labour, for a term not less than four years.'
Id. at 542.
146. See generally id. at 542-62 (ultimately concluding that "[t]he Indian nations had
always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their
original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial.").
147. Id. at 547.
148. Shadow, supra note 15, at 1513.
149. Id. at 1514. Professor Arkes suggests:
[T]hat these fastidious arrangements could be explained only if we take
seriously the understanding of the time: that the right to enter into contracts,
and to be bound only by consent, was not merely a "conventional" right, but a
"natural" right. It could be accorded then, with propriety, to any moral agent,
including an aborigine.
Id.

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

104

[Vol. 8:77

The holding in Worcester is merely a restatement of Chief Justice
Marshall's dissenting opinion in Ogden v. Saunders that the right to
contract is antecedent to the State."s' Although the Chief Justice dissented in
Saunders, it was due to his view that a contracting party would be legally
obliged even without the positive law.152 The majority opinion did not
discredit natural law; it merely believed moral obligation to be
unenforceable without the positive law.' In fact, Justice Marshall's natural
law foundation permeates the Marshall Court's understanding of the
freedom of contract and is representative of America's Constitutional
Consensus as applied to contract law. 54
2.

The Due Process Clause and Liberty of Contract

The Contract Clause was litigated for a few decades after Worcester, but
it ultimately became second fiddle as the Court began to develop its
substantive due process jurisprudence."' The aim of substantive due
process is to ensure that the government does not deprive a person of his
liberty without proper justification.5 6 This is achieved by reading
unenumerated rights into the word "liberty" of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.'"' Eventually the Court began to regard
that simple word, "liberty," as the source of rights; in doing so, it fabricated
the pretense that government, not the Creator, defines the scope of natural
rights.'
150. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 562 (holding that the Georgia law, which violated the
Indian's sovereignty, was "repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States").
151. Shadow, supra note 15, at 1514 (noting that "this was hardly a trivial point" and that
"[fjor Marshall it mattered profoundly").
152. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 346 (1827).
153. Id. at 235.
154. Shadow, supra note 15, at 1515.
155. Ely, supra note 96, at 371.
156. Chemerinsky, supra note 112, at 1501 (noting that "if you look through Supreme
Court opinions you will never find a definition").
157. Id. at 1509.
158. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3062 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Legal historian James W. Ely, Jr. attributes the demise of the Court's freedom of
contract jurisprudence, and the rise of its liberty of contract jurisprudence, largely to the
opinions of one man: Justice Stephen Field. Ely, supra note 96, at 384 ("Justice Stephen J.
Field, the most influential jurist of the Gilded Age, was instrumental in laying the
groundwork for due process protection for liberty of contract."). Ely notes that Justice Field,
in his concurrence in Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., as well as his dissents in
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Many scholars describe Liberty of Contract as "economic substantive due
process" due to Lochner, its case of origin, "proclaim[ing] freedom of
contract to be a fundamental right under the due process clause."'" Liberty
of Contract holds that individuals are free to bargain and contract on their
own terms, and "embodiels] a notion approaching an absolute transactional
liberty in economic matters."'6 0 Although Liberty of Contract relies heavily
on the Fourteenth Amendment for the premise and scope of liberty, it did
not originate with that Amendment's adoption. 6 ' Rather, it is the
simultaneous application of two preceding developments in constitutional
common law.' 62 That is, the doctrine combined the protections that had
been established for property and economic liberty, according to due
process, with the individual autonomy that had arisen from the Court's
limitation of the States' police power. 63
a. Allgeyer and the liberty of contract
Although the concept of Liberty of Contract is most commonly
associated with the Supreme Court case Lochner v. New York," the Court
first held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protected the right to contract years before Lochner in Allgeyer v.
Louisiana.'65 In Allgeyer, the Court voided a Louisiana statute that
prohibited insurance companies from outside of the state to do business
inside of the state without maintaining an authorized agent and a place of
business there.'" The decision unanimously declared that the statute
both Munn v. Illinois and Slaughter-House Cases, "urged recognition of the right of
individuals to pursue common occupations without governmental interference." Id.;
Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 754-60 (1884); Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113, 136-54 (1877); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83-111 (1873).
Justice Field's desire to protect individuals who engaged their autonomy in pursuit of
livelihood eventually gained prominence, and the right to contract was re-tooled so that the
individual was at liberty to achieve his goals. Ely, supra note 96, at 384.
159. Chemerinsky, supra note 112, at 1509.
160. CLINTON, supranote 113, at 65.
161. MAYER, supra note 8, at II.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2 ("Known as the "Lochner era," it is named for the best-known U.S. Supreme
Court decision protecting liberty of contract, Lochner v. New York."); Chemerinsky, supra
note 112, at 1509.
165. Allgeyer v. State of La., 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
166. Id. at 593.
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deprived Allgeyer of its liberty without due process of law, and, despite the
absence of the term 'liberty of contract,' the Court defined the scope of this
new doctrine:
The 'liberty' mentioned in [the Fourteenth Amendment] means,
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical
restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is
deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to b[e] free in the
enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for
that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper,
necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful
conclusion the purposes above mentioned. 167
The Court was careful to note, too, that the statue violated due process
"because it prohibits an act which under the federal constitution the
defendants had a right to perform,"16 and that the right to contract would
yield to the States' police power.169
b. Lochner and retention of natural law reasoning
Although "reviled [] and persistently misunderstood"' as the epitome of
72
judicial activism,"' a deeper look at Lochner v. New York' reveals that the
judges of the so-called "Lochner-era" were not merely "laissez-faire judges"
as Justice Holmes's dissent suggests.'73 Indeed, Justice Rufus Peckhamauthor of the Majority Opinion-and his colleagues "continued to think
Id. at 589.
Id. at 591.
Id. at 590-91.
ARKEs, supra note 3, at 79.
Id. at 80.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
ARKES, supra note 3, at 92.
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country
does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I
should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do
not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement
or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their
opinions in law .... The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics.
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
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that there was a moral ground that underlay the law," and "especially"
individual rights, "including the rights of property."' 74 As noted by
Professor Arkes, however, "it only stood to reason that the judges who
understood a moral ground for the rights of property were quite alert then
to the moral limits on those rights of property.""' In fact, Lochner and the
Lochner-era cases are seen as exemplifying natural law reasoning; thus,
"criticism of the 'Lochner era' became bound up with criticism of the
natural law."' 6 Ever the standard-bearer for economic liberty,"' Lochner
also stands for the general proposition that natural rights are not subject to
alteration or abolishment by a majority."'
The issue before the court in Lochner was whether the maximum-hours
provision of New York's Bakeshop Act was "a fair, reasonable, and
appropriate exercise of the police power.""' The provision in question,
justified as a health law enacted pursuant to the state's police power, limited
a baker's hours to no more than ten per day or sixty per week.' The Court
struck down the statute as unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because there was "no reasonable
foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate as a health law to
safeguard the public health, or the health of the individuals who are
following the trade of a baker."' The court noted that the quality of bread
did not depend on how many hours the bakers had worked and, further,
that bakers have the intelligence and capacity to care for themselves without
"the protecting arm of the state, interfering with their independence of
judgment and of action."182
That is, the Lochner Court protected rights of property-rights which
the Justices recognized as natural rights of the individual.'
It was
understood that the worker had a natural right "to his own labor" and this
174. ARKES, supra note 3, at 92.

175. Id.
176. O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 1515.
177. MAYER, supra note 8, at 2.
178. 113 CONG. REc. S1160 (2013) (Sen. Rand Paul filibuster).
179. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
180. Id. at 46, n.t (reproducing the statute at issue).
181. Id. at 58.
182. Id. at 57.
183. ARKES, supra note 3, at 94-95 (noting that "[t]he right to make a living at an
ordinary calling, to enter a legitimate occupation, without arbitrary restrictions, was a right
that ran as deep as the right to speak or publish.").
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Man's

ownership of his labor also means that the natural rights "to sell his labor
upon such terms as he deems proper," and "to quit the service of the
employer for whatever reason" are also vested in him."' This understanding
harkens back to the overarching principles of natural law recorded in the
Declaration, that the only legitimate form of government was one founded
upon consent.186 A man's "labor could be committed, his body commanded,
only with his consent.""' The Liberty of Contract doctrine enunciated in
Lochner served as recognition of these natural rights.'
Despite retaining the spirit of natural law, Liberty of Contract is a flawed
principle. As Justice Cardozo observed, "[tihe tendency of a principle to
expand itself to the limit of its logic may be counteracted by the tendency to
confine itself within the limits of its history."8 "[LIiberty of [C]ontract
could not 'expand itself to limit of its logic,"' argues Scholar and Professor
Robert Lowry Clinton, "because, logically it had no limits."' Additionally,
Liberty of Contract "could not have been confined 'within the limits of its
history' because it had no history."' By reading these unenumerated rights
into substantive due process, the meaning of "liberty" is expanded beyond
its natural law scope and is, indeed, limitless.192

184. Id. at 95 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (Field, J.,
dissenting)).
185. Id. (citing Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174 (1941)).
186. Shadow, supra note 15, at 1512; ARKES, supra note 3, at 95 ("For these judges, the
notion of 'liberty of contract' was freighted with the same moral significance that attached to
the notion of government by the consent of the governed.").
187. ARKES, supra note 3, at 95.
188. Id.
189. CLINTON, supra note 113, at 67 (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921)).
190. Id. Professor Clinton notes:
The experience that the [Liberty of Contract] doctrine symbolized was not that
of the Framers, or the ratifiers, or nineteenth-century Americans, or
'conventional morality' in any form; rather, it symbolized the interest of a small
group of economic and social elites who were able to enlist a small but
influential group of lawyers and judges in their support.

Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 68 ("NL]ike liberty of contract, the logic of personal privacy ultimately does not
admit of any principled limits.").
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C. Interpretationof the Constitution
The Court's modern jurisprudence exemplifies the notion that the way
one interprets the Constitution impacts the nature and scope of the rights
found within.'
Two well-established methods of constitutional
interpretation are the "Living Constitution" 94 and "Originalist""
approaches. The Living Constitution approach views the Constitution as a
"living document" that may be adapted to meet the needs and reflect the
moral compass of an ever-changing society."' Under this view, the laws and
principles in the Constitution are not fixed, nor tethered, to a permanent
standard."' Instead, the text's meaning is subject to change with the
perspective of society.'" The notion that the Constitution is living emerged
from the desire that the positive law consistently change to reflect the will of

193. CALVIN R. MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39 (3d ed. 2009); SAUL K.
PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 322 (1943).

194. This method travels under many names, Massey labels it 'Vectors of History,' but its
essential tenet is that the Constitution should be interpreted with the changing times.
MASSEY, supra note 193, at 39. For the sake of clarity and uniformity, this Comment will
refer to it as the 'Living Constitution method.'
195. Id. at 70.
196. Justice William Brennan, Address at the Georgetown University Text and Teaching
Symposium (October 12, 1985), available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/
index.asp?document=2342. Justice Brennan declared:
We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as
Twentieth Century Americans. We look to the history of the time of framing
and to the intervening history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must
be, what do the words of the text mean in our time. For the genius of the
Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is
dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with
current problems and current needs.
Id.
197. William T. Barrante, A Jurisdictional View of the United States Constitution, 83
CONN. B.J. 217, 249 (2009). Barrante proposes that "[t]he difference between a jurisdictional
constitution and a 'living' constitution is the difference between a real constitution and an
imaginary constitution." Id. Originalism, he adds, "may... be described as a jurisdictional
view of the Constitution." Id. at 217.
198. Id. at 223 (noting that the "Living Constitution" view holds that "the Constitution
must grow with the times"). This view is flawed because, as John Adams declared, the United
States Constitution will fail in the hands of a non-religious people. WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS,
supra note 37. Therefore, we must be governed by our Constitutional Consensus, as opposed
to the current, majoritarian consensus, in order to preserve our republic and its "Blessings of
Liberty." Id.; see U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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the majority.'" Under this view, truth is not absolute.200 instead, the
Constitution is read according to the "evolving standards of decency."20' In
effect, this view culminates in "history and precedent [being] largely
irrelevant; instead, unelected judges create policy to reflect modern needs
through the Constitution they themselves write."202
The other prominent method of Constitutional interpretation,
Originalism, examines historical evidence to determine what the drafters
meant to accomplish.203 Those who implement this method use the plain
meaning of words at the time the Constitution was adopted, and even the
structure of particular provisions therein.2 04 Originalism protects against the
fear that has persisted since America's founding-that without strict
adherence to the text of the Constitution, the Constitution itself will
become irrelevant.205 Thus, Originalism views the Constitution as a literal
document that establishes standards by which the country is bound.
199. Lisa K. Parshall, Embracing the Living Constitution: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's
Move Away from a Conservative Methodology of ConstitutionalInterpretation,30 N.C. CENT.
L. REV. 25, 29 (2007) ("The 'Living Constitution' has become a metaphor for an organic
vision of the Constitution, one which evolves in meaning, adapting to contemporary values
and practices.").
200. Id.
201. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) ("The Court recognized in [Weems v.
U.S.] that the words of the Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static. The
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.").
202. David Barton, A Tale of Two Constitutions,THE AMERICAN LEGION, October 2004, at
56.
203. KEN BLACKWELL & KEN KLUKOWSKI, RESURGENT: How CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSERVATISM CAN SAVE AMERICA 166 (Threshold Editions 2011) [hereinafter RESURGENT]
("[O]riginalism is the belief that any law-including the Constitution-must be interpreted
according to the original meaning of its words, as those words would have been understood
by a reasonably well-informed and educated voter at the time those words were adopted.").
As Justice Houston, of the Alabama Supreme Court explained:
When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, as in this case, courts
must enforce the statute as written by giving the words of the statute their
ordinary plain meaning-they must interpret that language to mean exactly
what it says and thus give effect to the apparent intent of the Legislature.
Ex parte T.B., 698 So. 2d 127, 130 (Ala. 1997).
204. See generally Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008) (noting that "[tihe
Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts: its prefatory clause and its operative
clause.").
205. Barrante, supra note 197, at 249 (referring to "an imaginary constitution" if the
"Living Constitution" method of interpretation is employed).
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Recently, the Supreme Court used the Originalist method of
constitutional interpretation as a vehicle to consider the natural right to
bear arms.206 In Districtof Columbia v. Heller, the Court first examined the
text of the Second Amendment, 207 along with historical evidence of how
that amendment was interpreted following its ratification.2 08 Upon
concluding that "the individual right to possess and carry weapons" was
guaranteed by the Second Amendment, 209 rather than end the analysis and
the opinion, the Court looked to the historical understanding of this natural
right for support. That is, in addition to the understanding of this right after
ratification of the Second Amendment, the Court discussed its breadth in
the century preceding the amendment.2 o The Court hastened to note this
step of the analysis was necessary "because it has always been widely
understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth
Amendments, codified a pre-existingright."2 11
Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
notes that this understanding of the right to bear arms influenced the court
in more than one way.212 Most obviously, it reinforced the Court's
holding-since the natural right to bear arms was an individual right and
unconnected to military service, the Second Amendment right to bear arms
must also be individual. After all, the Framers intended to codify the natural
right within the Second Amendment.2 13 The natural understanding was also
given priority over other "clues to meaning and intent."214 The Court argued
that it would be "dubious" to look to such evidence as drafting history for
scope and intent when it was "widely understood" that the Second
Amendment codified a pre-existing right, rather than a created one.215

206. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. See O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 1523 (asserting that "Heller
is at least as notable for its method of constitutional interpretation, as it is for its actual
holding").
207. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576-600.
208. Id. at 607-19.
209. Id. at 592.
210. Id. at 592-95.
211. Id. at 592. Indeed, the Court emphasizes Blackstone's belief that "the right of having
and using arms for self-preservation and defence" was "one of the fundamental rights of
Englishmen." Id. at 594 (citation omitted).
212. O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 1524.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1525.
215. Heller, 554 U.S. at 603.
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III. FROM LIBERTY TO LICENSE

The right to contract is a complex and fascinating paradigm. To contract,
man engages his autonomy to "bargain for [his] own advantage"21 6 and
"fashion his ... position in society." 217 But man is not entirely free from
restraint in this endeavor. 21 8 Therein lies the central issue this Comment
seeks to address-how is the extent and scope of man's right to contract
determined? This Comment outlined America's evolving treatment of
codified natural rights,2 19 and it will now advocate an appropriate
framework for interpreting codified natural rights. 220 The task at hand, then,
is to demonstrate how defining the scope of codified natural rights,
specifically the right to contract, without a natural law framework is-as
Justice Scalia put it-"dubious."2 21
To begin, it is worth repeating that a man's presuppositions about life
and the nature of things "mold [his] way of thinking, shape [his] values, and
direct the decisions that lie behind [his] actions and attitudes."222 The
Framers understood that God is the source of all law, and that the scope of
natural rights is defined by the "Laws of Nature and Natures [sic] God." 223
216. Ely, supra note 96, at 371.
217. Id. at 372.
218. See BARNETr, supra note 8, at 1-2 (noting that, at least, man is subject to positive law
restraints).
219. See supra Part I.
220. See discussion infra Part IV.
221. Heller, 554 U.S. at 603.
222. OVERMAN, supra note 6, at 11. Dr. Overman frames the importance of
presuppositions in this way:
We often underestimate the importance of unspoken assumptions behind the
spoken words and visible actions of those around us. Like an iceberg floating in
the ocean with just ten percent visible above the waves and ninety percent
below the surface, we sometimes lose sight of the fact that the words we hear
and read, and the actions of others that we see, are first shaped by invisible
thoughts, deep in the unseen world of the heart.
Id. at 12. Indeed, as Dr. Overman notes, "[presuppositions] not only affect individuals, they
also affect whole societies." Id.
223. See LocKE, supra note 16, at bk. II, ch. XI, § 135. As Locke notes:
The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but only in many cases
are drawn closer, and have by human laws known penalties annexed to them,
to enforce their observation. Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to
all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for other men's
actions, must, as well as their own and other men's actions, be conformable to
the law of nature, i.e., to the will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the
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These presuppositions were instilled in the common law, 224 inscribed into
the Declaration of Independence,225 and implemented by the
Constitution. 226 Thus, it is problematic that the Court's modern autonomy
jurisprudence,227 which has enveloped the right to contract, deviates from
this understanding.22 8
As discussed above, the right to contract was consistently analyzed in
light of its natural law foundation both prior and subsequent to the
Constitution's ratification.22 9 Over the last century, however, the Court's
fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human
sanction can be good, or valid against it.
Id.
224. This is evinced in many ways, one of which is the morality of the right to contract.
See Shadow, supra note 15, at 1513-16.
225. O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 1516. Judge O'Scannlain notes that:
The Declaration explicitly appeals to the natural law. It insisted "the Laws of
Nature and of Nature's God" entitled this country to dissolve its political bonds
with England, and declared that "[wie hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness." According to this seminal document, the purpose of government is
to protect these natural rights. In the Declaration's words: "to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men."
Id. (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1, 2 (U.S. 1776)).
226. HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION 65 (1990) [hereinafter BEYOND THE
CONsTITUTION] (noting that "the Founders were clear that the mission of the political order
was nothing less than the protection of natural rights.").
227. The term "autonomy jurisprudence" is used by this Comment to indicate the
various rights and doctrines used by the modern Court to increase the scope of autonomy
and individual liberty by circumventing morality. See Shadow, supra note 15, at 1516-18. A
few examples are the right to privacy under Griswold, the right to abortion under Roe, and
the right to homosexual activity under Lawrence. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
228. Shadow, supra note 15, at 1516. Indeed, as Professor Arkes notes:
This much may be said of the difference between the old apostles of "freedom
of contract" and the new partisans of "autonomy": The judges who spoke
seriously about the "freedom of contract" were alert to the moral ground from
which that freedom arose. For that reason, they were alert to the fact that the
freedom of contract could never encompass "the right to do a wrong" or to
contract for immoral things. The same premises that established the rightful
freedom of contract established an understanding, also, of the things that one
could not claim in the name of one's "freedom to contract."
Id.
229. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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autonomy jurisprudence subsumed the right to contract-a move that has
allowed the Court to pretend that it has extricated the right to contract from
its natural law underpinnings. Indeed, the notion of "liberty" is oft conflated
with "license." The Court's autonomy jurisprudence deftly demonstrates
this issue.
It is conventionally accepted that the right to privacy evolved from the
Court's liberty of contract jurisprudence.2 30 The Lochner-era cases
encompassed a vast array of protections outside of business and labor, and,
by doing so, elevated autonomy.2 31 Justice James C. McReynolds authored
two of these significant cases.2 32 In Pierce v. Society of the Sisters,2 33 the Court
struck down the Compulsory Education Act passed by the legislature of
Oregon, which required children under the age of sixteen to attend public
school. 234 Similarly, in Meyer v. Nebraska,235 the Court vacated a statute that
outlawed teaching children any language other than English.2 36 In Meyer,
Justice McReynolds listed a variety of rights the Court believed were
protected under "liberty" within the Fourteenth Amendment, or substantive
due process rights, including:
[T]he right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God

230.

MAYER, supra note 8, at 88. Mayer notes that:
Despite the popular assumption that the Court's protection of privacy as a
fundamental right began with its 1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,
some scholars have recognized that, long before the Griswold Court attempted
to derive privacy rights from the "penumbras" that emanated from particular
Bill of Rights guarantees, the Lochner-era Court had protected what today is
regarded as an important aspect of privacy, so-called parental rights.
Id. at 89.
231. See id. at 88-91. Mayer, and other scholars, consider this so because "the Court
protected liberty of contract by evaluating how laws limited persons' liberty-the substance
of the laws themselves, as distinct from the procedures by which laws were enacted or
enforced." Id. at 1-2.
232. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER THE LAW 177-78 (The John Hopkins Univ.
Press 1990) (1988) ("The right to privacy achieved constitutional status in two cases of the
Lochner era, the only substantive due process decisions that survived the 1937 revolution.").
233. Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
234. Id. at 530, 534-35.
235. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

236. WIECEK, supra note 232, at 178.

2013]f

RISING IN DEFENSE OF THE DECLARATION

115

according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.2 37
This notion of unenumerated substantive due process rights allowed the
Court to declare a constitutional "right to privacy" for married couples in
Griswold v. Connecticut.238 The right to privacy was later expanded to
include the childbearing decisions of individuals and unmarried couples in
39
which led to the notorious substantive due process
Eisenstadt v. Baird,2
40
case, Roe v. Wade.' Since Roe, the Court has also found that an individual's
right to privacy includes private homosexual conduct.241
The problem here is that the right to privacy is a natural right24 2 and, as
such, should be interpreted according to a Heller-like analysis, which would
consider the right's historical scope. Instead, the Court is now looking to
the word "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause for
237. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Mayer points out that the cases
additionally include, "the right of teachers to pursue their occupation and the right of private
schools to engage in business," as well as, "the educators' freedom to enter into contracts
with the parents." MAYER, supranote 8, at 91.
238. WIECEK, supra note 232, at 178. In Griswold, the Court voided a pair of statutes
prohibiting the giving of information about contraceptives to married people. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, found an
implicit right to privacy within the penumbras and emanations of the rights enumerated in
the Bill of Rights. Id. at 484 ("The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill
of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance."). A more historically faithful approach would have overturned the
Slaughter-House Cases by holding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment reserved all rights not given to the government to the people. See
generally 113 CONG. REc. S1161 (2013) (Sen. Rand Paul filibuster); McDonald v. City of
Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
239. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); WIECEK, supra note 232, at 178.
240. Id. at 178-79 ("The Eisenstadtextension proved to be a threshold to the preeminent
substantive due process decision of the modern era, Roe v. Wade (1973), which restricted the
powers of the states to regulate abortions.").
241. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). The Lawrence Court held that:
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot
demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them
the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government.
Id.
242. BARNErr, supra note 8, at 2.
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the existence and scope of the natural right to privacy. 24 3 In doing so, the
Court attempts to circumvent the natural law, in that the rights found
within the word "liberty" are not beholden to the inherent limits placed
upon them by their nature. This, however, departs from what the draftersof both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Constitution-understood and
intended. As discussed above, the Constitutional Consensus was to codify
natural rights, including their moral scope.'"
John Courtney Murray's description of one of the principles within our
Constitutional Consensus further illustrates the dichotomy between liberty
and license, and why this discussion matters:
"A free people": this term too has a special sense in the American
Proposition. America has passionately pursued the ideal of
freedom, expressed in a whole system of political and civil rights,
to new lengths; but it has not pursued this ideal so madly as to
rush over the edge of the abyss, into sheer libertarianism, into the
chaos created by the nineteenth-century theory of the "outlaw
conscience," conscientia exlex, the conscience that knows no law
higher than its own subjective imperatives. Part of the inner
architecture of the American ideal of freedom has been the
profound conviction that only a virtuous people can be free. It is
not an American belief that free government is inevitable, only
that it is possible, and that its possibility can be realized only
when the people as a whole are inwardly governed by the
recognized imperatives of the universal moral law.245
Today, however, "freedom" and "liberty" mean nothing more than
unencumbered opportunity for licentiousness and are used as a vehicle to
manipulate the natural scope of man's rights.246 This is evident in the
unprincipled manner by which the Court sources its autonomy
jurisprudence-the amalgam of substantive due process cases. By couching
numerous natural rights under the label of "privacy," the Court is able to
abrogate the right's proper constitutional framework. For example, many

243. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
244. See generally BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 226, at 65.
245. MURRAY, supra note 27, at 36.
246. See discussion supra Part II.A. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003)
(declaring that "[1]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.").
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"privacy" cases involve the right to contract. 24 7 The Court, however, seems
determined to sweep these subsidiary issues under the broad rug of
"privacy" rather than analyze their validity under a constitutional contract
doctrine.
This use of substantive due process is simply misguided. 248 The natural
law scope of the right to contract cannot be abrogated by interpreting it
within a different framework; the natural law is transcendent-similar to
the law of gravity.2 49 Man surely does not create either-he merely
recognizes them.25 0 This is in direct contradiction to those who would
invoke "liberty" or "autonomy" for freedom of action. The ability to act
autonomously does not equate to authority to act.25' Indeed, Justice Thomas
describes substantive due process as a "legal fiction" that disregards not
only the natural law but also our Constitutional Consensus.252
IV. PROPOSAL

The problems outlined above flow from one main wellspring-the
modern Court is operating under false presuppositions regarding the source
of natural rights and the rule of law. 25 3 These false presuppositions, in turn,
yield a judicial interpretation of natural rights that is inconsistent with
natural law principles and our Constitutional Consensus.254 By extracting
unenumerated rights from the word "liberty" in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause,255 the Court makes it clear that its goal is
247. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (upholding a woman's right to contract for an
abortion); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (involving the right of educators to enter
into contracts with parents).
248. ARKEs, supra note 3, at 55 (acknowledging that "[t]o invoke 'autonomy' is not to
invoke a license for a freedom emancipated from moral restraint.").
249. OVERMAN, supra note 6, at 56 ("That is, it exists above and independent of man.").
250. Id. ("Man does not invent these laws, he recognizes them, accepts them, and lives at
peace with them.").
251. Id.
252. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3062 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("[T]his fiction is a particularly dangerous one. The one theme that links the
Court's substantive due process precedents together is their lack of a guiding principle to
distinguish 'fundamental' rights that warrant protection from nonfundamental rights that do
not.").
253. See discussionsupra Parts I, IL.A, II.B.
254. See OVERMAN, supra note 6, at 11.
255. Justice Thomas declared this framework "particularly dangerous" and "a legal
fiction." McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3062 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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to establish natural rights without their natural limitations, rejecting natural
law principles.2 56 In doing so, the Court seemingly attempts to unshackle
natural rights from their implicit scope in an effort to make them alienable.
Therefore, this Comment proposes that the Court rededicate itself to our
Constitutional Consensus and implement natural law principles consistent
with the Declaration of Independence. With respect to the right to contract,
specifically, the Court has two options. First, the Court could revive either
of its seemingly outdated doctrines that prescribe recognition of the natural
law.25 7 Both the Freedom of Contract and Liberty of Contract doctrines
contain presuppositions that enable the Court to implement our
Constitutional Consensus regarding the right to contract-that its scope is
predefined and cannot be altered or abolished by a majority. Alternatively,
the Court could apply the Heller analysis to the right to contract, as well as
natural rights in general. The Heller framework looks to the original
understanding of preexisting rights to determine what the Framer's
intended the scope of such rights to be upon codification.258 Either of these
endeavors should strive to familiarize the law with the morally significant
underpinnings of the natural law. 29
Undoubtedly, the Law of Contracts has changed since the ratification of
the Constitution.2 60 Man's right to contract, however, has not-it is natural,

256. See O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 1528 (proposing that any "discerning
constitutional thinker must appreciate the extent to which the constitutional project
quintessentially was an effort to codify pre-existing natural law rights."); Shadow, supra note
15, at 1516.
257. Specifically, either the "Freedom" or "Liberty" of Contract Doctrines. See discussion
supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
258. O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 1525 (noting that "Heller tells us that natural law can
factor into constitutional interpretation in subtle, but significant ways. It tells us that, where
a constitutional provision codified a pre-existing, natural right, the historical understanding
of that natural right can clarify ambiguities in the constitutional text and elucidate the
rationale and scope of the constitutional right"); see generally Dist. of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008). The majority opinion in Heller is an excellent example of the proper
framework for interpreting natural rights. It should be lauded, but it is the exception, not the
rule.
259. See generally BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *40 (noting that "[God] has laid down
only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that existed in the nature of
things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and
evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms

supra note 8, at 138-39.
260. See supra Part II.B.

BURLAMAQUI,

....

"). See also
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inalienable, and predates government. 261' Although the Court's elevation of
autonomy, through its autonomy jurisprudence, is an attempt to judicially
enforce the collective aims of society, such a disposition surely misses the
forest for the trees. For it is self-evident that we are endowed with "objective
rights held by all humans as a matter of moral principle" 2 62 -ours is not to
define their scope, but merely recognize them.
A. Revive the Freedom or Liberty of ContractDoctrine
The Marshall Court developed the Freedom of Contract Doctrine by
applying this Constitutional Consensus to the Contract Clause of the
Constitution. 2 63 This doctrine recognized that the scope of man's right to
contract was defined by natural law. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
Ogden v. Saunders,26 although a dissent, is an exceptional example of the
proper framework for analyzing the right to contract. Consistent with the
founders, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the right to contract is
antecedent to the State.2 65 He went on to examine the right to contract in a
state of nature, as well as under the common law.266 Specifically, the Chief
Justice examined where the right to contract comes from and why nations

261. See supra notes 12, 15.
262. O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 1514.
263. See discussion Part II.B.1.
264. 25 U.S. 213 (1827).
265. Id. at 346 ("[individuals do not derive from government their right to contract, but
bring that right with them into society.").
266. Id. On the importance of looking to the State of Nature, philosopher John Locke
said:
To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, we must
consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect
freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as
they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature. But though this be a state
of liberty, yet it is not a state of license; though man in that state have an
uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not
liberty to destroy himself.
LOCKE, supra note 16, at bk. II, ch. II, § 4. See also BURLAMAQUI, supra note 8, at 126
(describing how man can "discover and know" God's natural law "by attentively considering
their state and nature"); MONTESQUIEU, supra note 16, at 6 ("Prior to all these laws are the
laws of nature... To know them well, one must consider a man before the establishment of
societies. The laws he would receive in such a state will be the laws of nature."). Montesquieu
notably posits that men receive law in a state of nature, rather than create. Id. at 7.
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and individuals alike recognize the validity of contracts.267 His simple
conclusion was "that obligation is not conferred on contracts by positive
law, but is intrinsic," and that the right to contract is "not given by society,
but [is] brought into it."268 In other words, the right is a natural right,
inherent to man's existence.269
Despite its lack of express limitations, the Liberty of Contract doctrine is
an exemplary commitment to natural law reasoning. Its re-invigoration
would be a boon to individual liberty and would implement our
Constitutional Consensus more faithfully. The doctrine provides the moral
significance of government by consent found within the Declaration, in that
it advances the notion of man's natural claim to ownership of his labor.
Preserved in the Liberty of Contract doctrine is the understanding that the
right to contract may only be claimed by a being capable of deliberating and
"offering, or withdrawing, his consent."270 By his nature, this being also
understands right and wrong, and therefore appreciates "the ends he [has]
no right to pursue" through contract.2 7 ' Indeed, the judges who applied
Liberty of Contract explicitly noted that man's right to contract "was very
much open to the restraints of the law."272
Application of either the Freedom or Liberty of Contract doctrines today
would banish the Court's autonomy jurisprudence, and replace it with a
framework that acknowledges, first, that man has natural rights that exist
outside of government and, second, that due to the inherent limitations
upon natural rights, contracts outside of legality or morality are void. This
would mean that congressional legislation, such as the Defense of Marriage
Act,27 3 would be redundant-because same-sex marriage is immoral, such a
contract could not stand under either of the aforementioned doctrines.
267. Saunders, 25 U.S. at 346. Chief Justice Marshall asks, "Whence is derived the
obligation of... contracts?" He notes that there exists no superior legislature to the state, but
even so, the "validity" of contracts "is acknowledged by all." Id. "In a state of nature ...
individuals may contract, their contracts are obligatory, and force may rightfully be
employed to coerce the party who has broken his engagement." Id.

268. Id.
269. Id.
270. ARKES, supra note 3, at 96.
271. Id.
272. Id. See discussion Part II.B.2.
273. H.R. REP. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906. The
"Purpose and Summary" section of the Defense of Marriage Act provides:
H.R. 3396, the Defense of Marriage Act, has two primary purposes. The first is
to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage. The second is to
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B. Apply the HellerAnalysis to Contracts
The modern Court, through its autonomy jurisprudence, is applying
improper presuppositions regarding the source of rights and law. This has
translated into the abandonment of natural law in order to pursue a false
notion of liberty. The Court either fundamentally misunderstands, or
plainly ignores, the source of all law. This simply distorts the scope of
natural rights-including the right to contract.2 74
Of all the methods of constitutional interpretation, only "Originalism,"
focuses on the intent of the drafters.27 5 This focus is inescapable; unless the
text is viewed through the lens of its drafter's intent, the meaning once
crafted into the text becomes malleable and the provisions within it are
subject to manipulation to meet any conceived objective.27 6 It is therefore
imperative to approach judicial interpretation with an original
understanding.27 7

protect the right of the States to formulate their own public policy regarding the
legal recognition of same-sex unions, free from any federal constitutional
implications that might attend the recognition by one State of the right for
homosexual couples to acquire marriage licenses.
To achieve these purposes, H.R. 3396 has two operative provisions. Section
2, entitled "Powers Reserved to the States," provides that no State shall be
required to accord full faith and credit to a marriage license issued by another
State if it relates to a relationship between persons of the same sex. And Section
3 defines the terms "marriage" and "spouse," for purposes of federal law only,
to reaffirm that they refer exclusively to relationships between persons of the
opposite sex.
Id.
274. THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton) (concluding that if a man is unaware
of natural law principles his interpretation of the law cannot be trusted).
275. MASSEY, supra note 193, at 41 ("[O]riginalism ... itself takes two forms: (1)
determining the original intent of the drafters of the Constitution or (2) establishing the
original meaning of its text" (internal quotation marks omitted)). According to President
Thomas Jefferson:
On every question of construction, [let us] carry ourselves back to the time
when the Constitution was adopted, recollect the spirit manifested in the
debates, and instead of trying what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or
invented against it, conform to the probable one in which it was passed.
PADOVER, supra note 193, at 322 (quoting a letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William
Johnson (June 12, 1823)).
276. Justice Antonin Scalia, Address to the Federalist Society (Feb. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,184815,00.html.
277. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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Additionally, when interpreting the scope of a natural, preexisting right,
the Court should commit itself to the natural right analysis used in District
of Columbia v. Heller.278 At issue in Heller was the natural right to bear
arms. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia employed Originalism to
examine the text of the Second Amendment and the relevant historical
evidence, but the analysis did not end there. Justice Scalia recognized that
the Framers understood that they were codifying a natural right with a
predefined scope and, thus, intended to codify that scope. From there,
Justice Scalia examined how the right to bear arms was understood in the
one hundred years preceding the drafting of the Constitution. As
demonstrated by Justice Scalia, the Framer's intent is still relevantespecially when interpreting natural rights. Understanding that the
Framer's intended to adopt the preexisting scope of natural rights upon
their codification, the Heller analysis will ensure that the Constitution is not
subverted in order to bestow rights upon the individual that supersede this
natural scope.279
In practice, application of the Heller natural right analysis would
undermine the right to privacy as currently understood, by re-incorporating
a moral component into contracts. The modern right to privacy confuses
"autonomy" with "licentiousness"-although these words represent two
very distinct notions regarding individual liberty and restraint.2s0 As moral
278. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008).
279. RESURGENT, supra note 203, at 168 (noting that agenda judges, in fact, "subvert the
Constitution").
280. ARKEs, supra note 3, at 55 ("To invoke 'autonomy' is not to invoke a license for a
freedom emancipated from moral restraint, in private or in public."). Burlamaqui
summarizes why this cannot be so in this way:
What would become of man and society, were every one to be so far master of
his actions, as to do every thing he listed, without having any other principle of
conduct than caprice or passion? Let us suppose, that God abandoning us to
ourselves, had not actually prescribed any rules of life, or subjected us to laws;
most of our talents and faculties would be of no manner of use to us. To what
purpose would it be for man to have the light of reason, were he to follow only
the impulse of instinct, without watching over his conduct? What would it avail
him to have the power of suspending his judgment, were he to yield stupidly to
the first impressions? And of what service would reflection be, were he neither
to choose nor deliberate; and were he, instead of listening to the counsels of
prudence, to be hurried away by blind inclinations? These faculties, which form
the excellence and dignity of our nature, would not only be rendered hereby
entirely frivolous, but, moreover, would become prejudicial even by their
excellence; for the higher and nobler the faculty is, the more the abuse of it
proves dangerous.
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beings with the ability to deliberate and reason, humans have the capacity to
ascertain the natural law-a basic appreciation of right and wrong.281 Once
man recognizes the natural law, his perception of autonomy should
change.282 Therefore, the right to contract, as well as the modern autonomy
jurisprudence, is restrained under positive law principles of legality, as well
as natural law principles of morality. 28 3
V. CONCLUSION

God is the source of man's "inalienable" natural rights-not a voting
majority. His law is, itself, immutable, and persists despite man's ability to
ignore its principles.284 To that end, the Court should return to the original
understanding of man's right to contract. That is, the Court should
endeavor to familiarize itself with the moral significance that defines the
right to contract. This principle is aligned with our Constitutional

This would be not only a great misfortune for man considered alone, and in
respect to himself; but would still prove a greater evil to him, when viewed in
the state of society. For this more than any other state requires laws, to the end
that each person may set limits to his pretensions, without invading another
man's right. Were it otherwise, licentiousness must be the consequence of
independence. To leave men abandoned to themselves, is leaving an open field
to the passions, and paving the way for injustice, violence, perfidy and cruelty.
Take away natural laws, and that moral tie which supports justice and honesty
in a whole nation, and establishes also particular duties either in families, or in
the other relations of life; man would be then the most savage and ferocious of
all animals.
BURLAMAQUI, supranote 8, at 134-35.
281. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
282. Romans 6:1-2 (asking "[wihat shall we say then? Are we to continue in sin that grace
may abound? By no means! How can we who died to sin still live in it?" and proposing
"For just as you once [were] slaves to impurity and to lawlessness leading to more
lawlessness, so now present your[selfJ as slaves to righteousness leading to sanctification");
Galatians5:13 ("For you were called to freedom, brothers. Only do not use your freedom as
an opportunity for the flesh.").
283. SHARMA, supra note 96, at 98 ("[Slince contracts are consensually assumed
obligations, in principle, within the confines set by the precepts of illegality and immorality,
the parties should be able to specify their own distinctive regime of rules to govern their
contractual relationship." (emphasis added)).
284. AQUINAS, supra note 16, at bk. I. pt. II. Q.94, art. 2, sed contra (discussing truths that
are per se nota, or true in themselves).
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Consensus,28 and allows for the natural scope of the right to contract to be
properly understood.

285. See discussion supra Parts I, II.A.

